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REVERSE TRANSPLANT TOURISM
KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC*
MICHAEL A. REES**
I
INTRODUCTION
In this article, we propose a novel form of kidney transplantation involving
cross-border kidney-paired donation, which we refer to as reverse transplant
tourism (RTT). Although RTT is currently still a hypothetical—to date, no
RTT swaps have been performed—we argue that such a program, if properly
structured, is both legal and ethical and is a natural next step in the
development of kidney exchange.
Kidney exchanges, in which patients with willing but incompatible living
kidney donors exchange their donors’ kidneys, have become common in the
United States. RTT takes this approach a step further by redefining
incompatibility to include not only immunological barriers, but also a more
prevalent incompatibility when transplantation is considered worldwide: the
barrier of poverty. In the United States, there are many patients with kidney
failure (known as end-stage renal disease (ESRD)) who have insurance to pay
for a transplant, but whose donors have the wrong blood type or human
1
leukocyte antigens (HLAs) and thus are not immunologically compatible. In
contrast, there are many poor patients outside of the United States with willing
compatible living donors, who are not able to afford the immunosuppression
2
necessary to sustain a renal transplant. In both these cases, the patients face
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1. A patient with preexisting antibodies capable of binding to the donor’s kidney will cause
rejection of the kidney. For this reason, the presence of donor-specific antibodies is assessed prior to
transplantation, and if identified, the transplant is not performed. Antibodies that cause rejection
generally recognize the blood group or human leukocyte antigen (HLA) markers. Antibodies binding
to HLA markers result from exposure of the human immune system to cells from other humans
through pregnancy, blood transfusion, or organ transplantation. For this reason, women are more likely
to suffer from immunological incompatibility than men. See Charles B. Carpenter, Histocompatibility
Systems, in TRANSPLANTATION (Leo C. Ginns, A. Benedict Cosimi & Peter J. Morris eds., 1999).
2. The international donor–recipient pair could also be both immunologically incompatible and

KRAWIEC_REES_FORMATTED

146

11/11/2014 4:02 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 77:145

barriers that prevent the transplant from moving forward.
RTT, if properly structured, can provide an opportunity for impoverished
foreign patients to overcome their financial barriers and for American
recipients to overcome immunological barriers through an international
exchange of kidneys. The use of biologically compatible pairs would also
expand the donor pool in important ways, with particular benefits for O–blood
3
type recipients and “sensitized” recipients.
Moreover, RTT reverses some of the more pernicious effects of typical
transplant tourism, in which comparatively wealthy individuals with ESRD
travel abroad, normally to a comparatively poor country, to purchase organs for
4
transplantation. These black-market transactions have been widely condemned
not only for commercializing organ transplantation, but also for producing a net
outflow of organs from the developing world to the developed world (with
accompanying cash flows in the opposite direction) under conditions that fail to
5
guarantee any protections for either donor or recipient.
RTT, in contrast, leverages the donative intent and reciprocity of friends
and family inherent in the kidney paired–donation model to avoid the netoutflow or organ-deficit problem of traditional transplant tourism—under RTT,
organ flows out of each country are matched with inflows. RTT also extends the
benefits of the U.S. transplant system to impoverished nations, allowing
patients who could never afford a kidney transplant to obtain one.
The “reverse” in reverse transplant tourism thus carries a double meaning.
One meaning is literal and geographic—impoverished foreign patients travel to
the United States to receive a kidney transplant they could not acquire in their
home country, rather than the other way around. But the other meaning is
figurative—RTT reverses many of the negative effects of traditional transplant
tourism by avoiding the organ-deficit problem of typical transplant tourism and
financially destitute, thus explicitly fitting within the plain language of the exception provided in the
Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act (Norwood Act), Pub. L. No. 110-144, 121 Stat. 1813
(2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273b, 274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). See infra text accompanying notes
25–26 (discussing AUKPD and the Norwood Act). Practically, however, a much greater impact will be
achieved through the inclusion of biologically compatible, but destitute, pairs. Thus, throughout this
article we assume that the international pair is biologically compatible and specifically analyze the
legally more complex, but medically more practical, possibility of RTT with biologically compatible
international pairs.
3. Roughly thirty percent of patients on the kidney waiting list are considered “sensitized,”
meaning that they have high antibody levels that react to foreign tissue. Highly Sensitized Patients,
http://www.montefiore.org/nephrology-kidney-transplant-program-highly-sensitizedMONTEFIORE,
patients (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). These patients are harder to match for donor kidneys. See infra text
accompanying note 78 (discussing the advantages of RTT for sensitized patients).
4. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Transplant Tourism: The Ethics and Regulation of International
Markets for Organs, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269 (2013).
5. For a debate on the ethics of transplant tourism, see Tarif Bakdash & Nancy Scheper-Hughes,
Is It Ethical for Patients with Renal Disease to Purchase Kidneys from the World’s Poor?, 3 PLOS MED.,
1699, 1699 (2006); see also Alexander M. Capron, Six Decades of Organ Donation and the Challenges
That Shifting the United States to a Market System Would Create Around the World, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 25 (reviewing international organ black markets and attempts to
combat them).
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by building on the system of protections for donors and recipients already
present in the U.S transplant system.
In order to develop a proper structure for RTT, the United States must
partner with countries that have enough infrastructure available to their citizens
to ensure that ongoing transplant-specific medical care is available and that
local conditions are safe for immunosuppressed patients, so that kidney
transplants for impoverished patients are not lost to preventable causes. Other
safeguards could include patient-screening protocols, standards and procedures
to ensure organ quality, and firewalls between the nonprofit funder and
participating transplant centers and, eventually, between the nonprofit and any
6
insurance and pharmaceutical companies that provide funding.
In part II we introduce the concept of kidney-paired donation (KPD) and an
increasingly common variant, altruistically unbalanced kidney-paired donation
(AUKPD), and argue that RTT is less ethically controversial in some respects
than AUKPD because neither participant in an RTT swap could successfully
transplant without the swap. In part III we detail our RTT proposal, illustrating
the mechanics and expenses of the exchange. In part IV we analyze RTT’s
7
permissibility under the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), concluding
that neither the text nor legislative history provide significant insight into the
potential scope of the term “valuable consideration” beyond the obvious
concerns of the commercial buying and selling of kidneys. In part V we consider
the policy rationales that might motivate the ban against the exchange of
valuable consideration for transplantable organs, concluding that RTT does not
threaten any of these policy concerns and in fact improves on the status quo
with respect to some concerns. In part VI we discuss the numerous benefits of
RTT, both to the individual patient participants and to the health-care system
more generally. In part VII we discuss what would be necessary to start, sustain,
and safeguard an RTT program, and in part VIII we conclude.
II
AN INTRODUCTION TO KPD
In this part, we introduce KPD, as practiced domestically in the United
States, and the relevant laws governing it. This discussion helps set the stage for
our RTT proposal, which we describe in detail in part III.
A. Conventional KPD
Estimates suggest that roughly 6000 ESRD patients on the kidney waiting
8
list have a willing, but incompatible, living donor. KPD arose as a means to
permit these patients, whose willing donors cannot donate directly because they

6. See infra Part VII (discussing these and other safeguards).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
8. Dorry L. Segev et al., Kidney Paired Donation and Optimizing the Use of Live Donor Organs,
293 JAMA 1883, 1884 (2005).
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have the wrong blood type or HLA antigens, to nonetheless receive kidney
transplants. Under the simplest form of KPD, a willing but incompatible donor
for one person in need of a transplant donates to another person in need of a
transplant with whom they are compatible. In return, that recipient’s willing but
incompatible donor returns the favor, donating to the first donor’s desired
9
recipient.
To illustrate, suppose that Amanda wants to donate a kidney to Bob but is
unable to do so, either because their blood types do not match or because there
is some other incompatibility. Another pair, Carlos and Diana, faces the same
problem. However, Carlos is compatible with Bob, and Amanda is compatible
with Diana. By swapping, as illustrated in figure 1, KPD enables two
transplants, providing both Bob and Diana with a compatible kidney. Although
KPD began with this type of two-pair exchange, longer exchanges and chains of
10
transplants have recently come to dominate.
KPD has experienced rapid growth in recent years due to advancements in
11
kidney-matching algorithms and the ability to ship organs. Yet barriers
remain. Specifically, O–blood type recipients are disadvantaged in a KPD
system. If one considers a pool limited to blood-type-incompatible pairs, there
will be no O–blood type donors. This is because, as universal donors, most O–
blood type donors are able to donate to their intended recipients, unless the
intended recipient has antibodies directed against the donor’s kidney. Thus, O–
blood type donors are enrolled into KPD pools only when the recipient has
donor-specific antibodies that render the intended donor incompatible. As a
result, O–blood type recipients, who can only receive from O–blood type
donors, are less likely to find suitable donors through KPD, given the shortage
12
of O-donor pairs in the pool. This is a troubling fact, given that O–blood type
candidates comprise more than half of the waiting list and have longer median
waiting times than other blood-group candidates, such as those with blood
13
group A.
Some KPD programs now attempt to mitigate this problem by admitting
biologically compatible donor–recipient pairs. These exchanges operate in the

9. UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, OPTN KIDNEY PAIRED DONATION PILOT
PROGRAM 2 (2013), available at http://www.unos.org/docs/Living_Donation_KidneyPaired.pdf.
10. See generally M. L. Melcher et al., Chain Transplantation: Initial Experience of a Large
Multicenter Program, 12 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2429 (2012); Michael A. Rees et al., A
Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain, 360 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1096 (2009).
11. See generally D. L. Segev et al., Transporting Live Donor Kidneys for Kidney Paired Donation:
Initial National Results, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 356 (2011); C. Bradley Wallis et al., Kidney
Paired Donation, 26 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 2091 (2011).
12. Jeremy M. Blumberg, Kidney Paired Donation: Advancements And Future Directions, 16
CURRENT OPINION IN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 380–81 (2011).
13. Table 1.4: Characteristics of Waiting List Patients at End of Year: 2002 to 2011, SCI. REGISTRY
TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS, http://www.srtr.org/annual_Reports/2011/104_can-abo_dh.aspx (last
DEP’T
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVICES,
updated
Dec.
4,
2012);
U.S.
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/advancedData.asp (all Kaplan-Meier Median Waiting Times
For Registrations Listed: 1999–2004).
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Figure 1

B. AUKPD and the Casse for RTT
Although the inclusiion of compa
atible pairs iin KPD proggrams is not without
controversy, many KPD
D programs now includ
de compatiblle pairs, duee to the
potential utiilitarian ben
nefit just desccribed: increeasing numbers of O–blo
ood type
donors in the
t
pool. For
F
example
e, one studyy found that the inclu
usion of
compatible pairs in a national KP
PD registryy could morre than dou
uble the
probability that donor–
–recipient pairs
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find a compatible KPD matcch, from

14. Lloyd E. Ratner et al.., The Altruistic Unbalanced Paaired Kidney Exxchange: Proof o
of Concept
P
Donor and Recipient Attitudes,
A
89 TRA
ANSPLANTATION
N 15, 21 (2010).
and Survey of Potential
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37.4% to 75.4%.
The controversy surrounding AUKPD programs is apparent from their
name: “altruistically unbalanced.” The typical objection is that incompatible
pairs receive something of great value (a compatible organ), while the
compatible pair enters a complex exchange unnecessarily and without
16
countervailing benefit. Some commentators dispute this objection, noting that
17
compatible pairs do indeed receive countervailing benefit. For example, it may
be possible to improve the compatible recipient’s outcome by allowing her to
“trade up” to a younger organ, a more appropriately sized organ, or a better
18
immunological match. In addition, the term “unbalanced” implies some
inequality in the exchange, but some researchers contend that altruism may be a
source of psychological benefit to compatible pairs, rather than an indication of
19
an ethical problem weighing against the pairs’ inclusion.
Though the increasing acceptance of AUKPD has implications for the legal
status of RTT, which are detailed in the following subpart, it is worth noting
that RTT does not implicate the same ethical concerns. Rather than presenting
a potentially unbalanced exchange, RTT leaves both involved pairs better off.
One pair, though biologically compatible, would be unable to engage in the
transplant due to financial constraints. The other, biologically incompatible pair
would be unable to transplant due to incompatibility. RTT provides substantial
benefit to both pairs, permitting two transplants to occur that otherwise would
not. With respect to ethical concerns regarding altruistic balance, therefore,
RTT is less problematic than existing compatible–incompatible KPD programs.
Of course, RTT raises other legal and ethical concerns not posed by domestic
AUKPD. As discussed in parts V and VI, however, these concerns are
surmountable and can be adequately addressed through a variety of safeguards.
C. The Legal Status of AUKPD and Implications for RTT
Despite the differing ethical issues posed by AUKPD and RTT, the growing
acceptance of AUKPD is relevant to the legal status of RTT under NOTA.
NOTA prohibits the knowing acquisition, receipt, or transfer of “any human
organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer
20
affects interstate commerce.” NOTA does not define the term valuable
consideration and, as detailed in part IV, the Act’s legislative history provides

15. S. E. Gentry et al., Expanding Kidney Paired Donation Through Participation by Compatible
Pairs, 7 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2361, 2365 (2007).
16. See David Steinberg, Compatible-Incompatible Live Donor Kidney Exchanges, 91
TRANSPLANTATION 257, 258 (2011).
17. Id. at 259.
18. Blumberg, supra note 12, at 382–83.
19. Compare, e.g., Lainie Friedman Ross & E. Steve Woodle, Ethical Issues in Increasing Living
Kidney Donations by Expanding Kidney Paired Exchange Programs, 69 TRANSPLANTATION 1539
(2000) (criticizing altruistically unbalanced kidney-paired exchange as ethically problematic), with
Ratner et al., supra note 14, at 21 (defending AUKPD).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
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almost no guidance regarding the meaning of the term beyond the obvious
21
legislative concerns of “buying,” “selling,” and “commerce” in human organs.
In the Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act (Norwood Act),
however, Congress provided some guidance on what is not valuable
22
consideration. Specifically, the Norwood Act provides that NOTA’s ban
against valuable consideration does not apply to KPD exchanges among
23
biologically incompatible pairs. Neither AUKPD nor the increasingly common
nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic donor (NEAD) chain—both of which
24
developed after passage of the Norwood Act—are mentioned.
This raises two points relevant to the RTT discussion. First, and most
specifically, although only biologically incompatible pairs are specifically
exempted by the Norwood Act, as already noted, AUKPD employs compatible
pairs and is becoming increasingly common. Importantly, any controversy
surrounding AUKPD is an ethical controversy, not a legal one—our research
has uncovered no suggestion in either the legal or medical literature that the
practice is illegal under NOTA. Thus, there is already precedent for the use of
biologically compatible pairs in KPD, as contemplated by our RTT proposal.
Second, and more significantly, the growing use of AUKPD and NEAD
chains reinforces the notion, explored more fully in Part IV, that the Norwood
Act provides a nonexclusive exemption, or safe harbor, from the definition of
valuable consideration. There is no suggestion that Congress intended its failure
to specifically exempt any activity to be read as a condemnation of that activity.
In fact, just the opposite is true. The Norwood Act’s legislative history suggests
that the ban on “valuable consideration” remains the touchstone for
determining legality under NOTA. Indeed, during congressional deliberations
on the Norwood Act, many members of Congress emphasized that the statute
was unnecessary, as it should have been obvious that KPD did not involve
25
“valuable consideration” as contemplated by NOTA.
The prevalence of AUKPD and NEAD chains further supports this
interpretation. The text and legislative history of both NOTA and the Norwood
Act, along with current transplant practice, thus suggest that RTT is prohibited
only if it involves the transfer of a human organ in exchange for valuable
21. See infra notes 41–47 and accompanying text (providing examples); see also, Kieran Healy &
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Custom, Contract, and Kidney Exchange, 62 DUKE L.J. 645 (2012) (discussing
possible legal and cultural meanings and ambiguities in the phrase “valuable consideration”).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273b, 274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
23. Id.
24. A NEAD chain is similar to a kidney swap. However, in a NEAD chain, an altruistic donor
gives a kidney to a patient who already knows a willing but biologically incompatible donor. The
incompatible donor then donates to a recipient in a similarly situated donor–patient pair, potentially
initiating a chain of transplants among a series of incompatible pairs. The addition of the altruistic
donor at the front of the chain means NEAD chains, unlike kidney swaps, are unconstrained by
simultaneity and reciprocity, allowing longer chains with more transplants. See generally Rees et al.,
supra note 10 (discussing NEAD chains in more detail); see also Healy & Krawiec, supra note 21
(discussing the application of NOTA and the Norwood Act to NEAD chains).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 53–62 (providing examples).
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consideration. We address the legality of RTT under NOTA’s prohibition
against valuable consideration in part IV, below.
III
AN RTT PROPOSAL
To illustrate the mechanics of our RTT proposal, recall the donor–recipient
pairs of Amanda–Bob and Carlos–Diana. Imagine now, however, that Carlos
and Diana, rather than facing biological incompatibility, face a different
problem: They are poor and live in a country where poverty is a barrier to
transplantation. For a specific example, assume that Carlos and Diana live in
Mexico. The Mexican health care system pays for the basic medical costs of
transplantation, such as the nephrectomy, transplant, and the inpatient and
outpatient costs associated with the surgery. Importantly, however, the most
basic form of public health insurance in Mexico does not pay for the outpatient
immunosuppressive drugs necessary to prevent Diana’s body from rejecting
Carlos’s kidney, which cost at least several thousand dollars per year and which
Diana must take for the rest of her life. Unless Diana has sufficient personal
wealth to pay for this ongoing long-term care, therefore, transplantation is
doomed to failure.
As illustrated in figure 2, RTT can help both Bob and Diana, allowing each
to receive a kidney that each otherwise could not—in Bob’s case because of his
biological incompatibility with Amanda, and in Diana’s case because of her lack
of access to adequate long-term immunosuppression. Under RTT, the domestic
pair (Amanda and Bob) would both remain in the United States, while Carlos,
the international donor, would travel to the United States for transplantation,
and Diana, the international recipient, would remain in her home country (in
Diana’s case, Mexico). The expenses of the swap would be paid by a
combination of three parties: the Mexican government, Bob’s insurance
26
provider, and a nonprofit organization established to pay for the excess
medically necessary expenses associated with RTT swaps.
These excess medically necessary expenses arise because each RTT swap is
purposely designed to ensure that neither the U.S.-based insurance provider
nor the Mexican government pay more for any single RTT transplant than
would be required for a transplant directly from Amanda to Bob or from Carlos
to Diana, respectively. In the aggregate, however, and as detailed in part VI,
RTT could eventually reduce the long-term costs of ESRD to both the U.S. and
Mexican governments and to U.S. insurance providers, due to the cost savings
of transplantation as compared to dialysis. In the next two subparts, we detail
these RTT expenses, specifying which costs are allocated to the nonprofit
entity, versus the U.S.-based insurance provider and the Mexican government.
Figure 2

26. The term “insurance provider” includes both commercial insurance providers and Medicare,
as applicable.
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Table 1
Amanda

Bob

Carlos

Diana

Domestic
Donor

Domestic Recipient

International
Donor

International
Recipient

Location

United States

United States

Travel to
United States

Mexico

Costs paid
by Mexican
government

Nephrectomy
and other
associated
medical
costs, up to
normal
amounts
required for
a transplant
performed in
Mexico.

N/A

N/A

Outpatient clinic
visit, all inpatient
admission
expenses, cost of
subsequent care

Costs paid
by Bob’s
insurance or
Medicare

N/A

All costs of
transplantation,
immunosuppressive
drugs (up to three
years if Medicare
primary)

All medical
costs
(nephrectomy,
domestic
kidney
shipping, if
any)

N/A

Costs paid
by nonprofit
organization

Kidney
shipping and
medical costs
in excess of
normal
expenses for
nephrectomy
in Mexico

N/A

All travel,
food, and
lodging costs

Outpatient
immunosuppressive
drugs (up to ten
years) and to
transportation to
and from the clinic
or hospital

B. The Carlos–Bob Transplant
The Carlos–Bob transplant is illustrated in figure 4. Carlos, the international
donor, would have to travel to the United States for a nephrectomy, because
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) specifies that
U.S. transplant centers may only transplant living-donor kidneys that have been
removed at an OPTN-approved living-donor nephrectomy site, and there are
27
no approved sites outside of the United States. All of Carlos’s medical costs
27. OPTN specifies that live kidney donation is only permissible when the transplanted kidney is
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Figure 4

IV
RTT UNDER NOT
TA
The lega
al status of RTT under NOTA iss best underrstood by aanalyzing
NOTA’s applicability to
o each comp
ponent of thee RTT swap
p. The RTT m
medicalexpense pay
yments by U.S.
U insurance providerss and the M
Mexican goveernment
removed at an
n OPTN membe
er transplant fa
acility. ORGAN PROCUREMEN
NT & TRANSPLA
ANTATION
NETWORK POL
LICIES 14.7.C (20
014), available att http://optn.tran
nsplant.hrsa.govv/ContentDocum
ments/
OPTN_Policiess.pdf (“Transpla
ant hospitals tha
at perform livingg donor transplaants must only accept and
transplant living donor organss recovered at OPTN
O
member recovery hospiitals that are ap
pproved to
perform living donor
d
recovery for that organ ty
ype.”). Because OPTN memberr facilities are on
nly located
within the Un
nited States, thiis policy effecttively bans imp
porting organs from living do
onors. See
SERVICES,
Transplant
Centers,
U.S.
DEP
E ’T
HEAL
LTH
&
HUM.
h.asp (choose “ Transplant Cen
nters” in Step 1 and “All
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/search
4) (listing all meember transplan
nt facilities, non
ne of which
Regions” for Sttep 2) (last visited Feb. 25, 2014
are located outsside of the Unite
ed States).
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are—by design—simply the normal reimbursements for transplantation by each
of these entities and are legally unproblematic. Therefore, we analyze only
those expenses covered by the nonprofit entity. In our example, and as detailed
in table 1, those expenses include (1) Amanda’s kidney-shipping and medical
costs in excess of normal expenses for nephrectomy in Mexico; (2) all of
Carlos’s travel, food, and lodging costs; and (3) the cost of Diana’s outpatient
immunosuppressive drugs (for up to ten years of treatment) and of her
28
transportation to and from the transplant clinic or hospital.
In this part, we consider whether NOTA’s ban on valuable consideration
applies to each of these expenses by examining the statute’s text and legislative
history, as well as the Norwood Act’s amendments to NOTA. In part IV.A, we
discuss the plain text of NOTA, concluding that it exempts the first two
expenses listed above from being considered valuable consideration. The third
expense, however, requires more analysis, which we undertake in parts IV.B.-C,
concluding that the text and legislative history of NOTA and the Norwood Act
provide little insight into the intended scope of the ban against valuable
consideration beyond the obvious concerns with the commercial buying and
selling of human organs. In part V, however, we conclude that the public
policies underlying NOTA ultimately suggest that a well-designed RTT
program would not involve valuable consideration.
A. NOTA’s Plain Text
As previously discussed, NOTA prohibits the knowing acquisition, receipt,
or transfer of “any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
29
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.” Although the term
“valuable consideration” is not defined, NOTA specifically excludes certain
payments from the definition:
The term “valuable consideration” does not include the reasonable payments
associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation,
quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and
lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of
30
the organ.

Under the plain language of the statute, items one and two of the RTT
reimbursements discussed above and categorized in table 1 are exempt from

28. U.S. and Mexican insurers treat travel expenses in the same manner: Insurance pays for the
costs of health care, but not for the costs associated with travel, food, and lodging to and from the
hospital or clinic. SECRETARIA DE SALUD, SEGURO POPULAR: CARTA DE DERECHOS Y
OBLIGACIONES [PUBLIC INSURANCE: PAMPHLET OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS], available at
http://www.seguropopular.gob.mx/images/Contenidos/beneficios/ARMADO_CARTA_DER_Y_OBLIG_Low.pdf. For a
poor patient who lives four to six hours away from her transplant center and has no means of
transportation, this might be a significant barrier to attending outpatient clinic visits, especially if an
overnight stay is required. In the case of a minor, these expenses would need to be covered not only for
the minor, but for a parent or guardian, as well.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
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NOTA’s definition of valuable consideration, provided they are reasonable in
amount. The components of item three, however—the payments for Diana’s
outpatient immunosuppressive drugs and her transportation to and from the
transplant clinic or hospital—are not explicitly addressed by NOTA.
It may appear, at first glance, that these reimbursements are also excluded
from NOTA’s prohibition against “valuable consideration,” based on the plain
language of the statute. After all, Diana, the recipient of the reimbursements at
issue, is an organ recipient, not an organ donor. And although Carlos gives up
his kidney, he receives no direct compensation in return. It is thus tempting to
conclude that, under the plain language of NOTA’s text, the prohibition against
valuable consideration in exchange for a human organ has no bearing on these
reimbursements.
Such a conclusion would be premature. A skeptic could argue that, when
Carlos agrees to donate his kidney through RTT so that Diana can receive the
immunosuppression and medical transport necessary to complete her
transplant, Carlos has received valuable consideration in exchange for his
kidney. The transaction, one could argue, is equivalent to Carlos exchanging his
kidney for cash, then using that money to purchase the immunosuppressive
31
drugs and transport for Diana. Accordingly, we assume that one must look
elsewhere to determine whether the reimbursements to Diana pass muster
under NOTA. That determination requires an analysis of NOTA’s legislative
history as well as the possible policy rationales behind the statute, an analysis
we undertake in parts IV B-C and V.
Before undertaking that analysis, though, we emphasize that we do not wish
to make too much of the “kidney for cash which is then used to purchase drugs
and transport” analogy, as similar analogies could be—but have not been—used
to prohibit many transplant innovations developed after NOTA’s passage that
result in some non-pecuniary benefit to the organ donor. Traditional KPD,
AUKPD, and NEAD chains are each legal examples in which a donor agrees to
transfer her kidney only in exchange for something of value. In the case of
KPD, AUKPD, and NEAD chains, the value received is a compatible kidney
for a friend or family member. In the case of RTT, the value received is
medically necessary immunosuppression, transportation to and from the
transplant clinic or hospital, and a compatible kidney transplant for a friend or
family member. Yet, Congress has explicitly exempted KPD from NOTA’s
prohibition against the exchange of valuable consideration for transplantable
organs (though, as discussed in part IV.C., many members of the Norwood Act
Congress argued that an explicit exemption was unnecessary). And AUKPD
and NEAD chains are increasingly common, despite the lack of an explicit
congressional exemption. The common assumption (and one that we share)
appears to be that AUKPD and NEAD chains are legally permissible because
of their similarity to KPD, the underlying federal concerns that prompt the ban
31. Cf. Choi et al., infra note 38, at 283 (discussing “altruism exchanges” and their status under
NOTA).
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against valuable consideration, and something that we refer to as the “perfect
world donative intent” of each participant—in a perfect world, each donor
would give altruistically to her friend or family member, but in actuality is
32
prevented from doing so by real-world barriers. RTT shares these
characteristics. This similarity, together with NOTA’s legislative history, the
Norwood Act, and policy rationales, all support our contention that RTT drug
and transportation costs do not fall within the definition of valuable
consideration, as the NOTA-enacting Congress understood that term.
B. The Ambiguous Phrase “Valuable Consideration:” What Did Congress
Mean?
As we illustrate in this section, neither the text nor legislative history of
NOTA provide meaningful insight into the phrase “valuable consideration” in a
setting, such as RTT, that involves no commercial buying or selling of human
organs. Standing alone, then, neither the text nor legislative history of NOTA
answers the question of whether Diana’s RTT reimbursements constitute
valuable consideration under NOTA. Of course, these sources for
understanding the meaning of the term do not stand alone. As we detail in the
following part V, courts—when faced with ambiguous meanings not clarified
through the text or legislative history—typically turn to the possible underlying
policy rationales, particularly if those rationales were explicitly discussed by the
enacting Congress.
Although NOTA is today most often discussed in connection with its
prohibition of valuable consideration, it is important to remember that such a
ban was not the central purpose of the statute, and was added to the statute
relatively late. Original drafts of NOTA addressed only the development of a
33
national organ procurement and distribution system. The prohibition on
compensated organ donation was added later, in response to a Washington Post
article about the plans of H. Barry Jacobs, a Virginia physician whose medical
license had previously been revoked for Medicare fraud, to establish a for-profit
34
organ brokerage.
Perhaps because the “valuable consideration” language was a late addition
to the statute in response to a specific concern, NOTA’s legislative history
addresses the term “valuable consideration” only with respect to that concern,
and does not provide much insight into the term’s breadth beyond the
commercial-exchange context. The extent to which the term should reach RTTlike exchanges that, while noncommercial, involve the donor receiving some
limited benefit, is not entirely clear.

32. See Healy & Krawiec, supra note 21 (arguing that NEAD chains can be squared with both the
language and legislative history of NOTA, despite the exchange of something of great value).
33. Sally Satel, Joshua C. Morrison, & Rick K. Jones, State Organ Donation Incentives Under the
National Organ Transplant Act, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 217 (discussing the
origination of NOTA’s ban on valuable compensation).
34. Id.
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Most analyses of the term “valuable consideration”—including an
influential Department of Justice memo on the topic—conclude that the phrase
35
has no clear meaning. Although the term “consideration,” with origins in the
common law of contract, has a fairly well established meaning that clearly
encompasses a variety of nonmonetary bargains, the significance (if any) of the
36
additional word “valuable” is much less clear. The phrase is rarely defined,
and the meaning, to the extent that one is discernable, appears to have varied
37
across time, place, and setting. Although some sources treat the two terms as
synonymous, other sources (including cases, statutes, and secondary sources)
38
suggest that the word “valuable” denotes a financial or pecuniary gain.
Other elements of NOTA and its legislative history reinforce the notion that
Congress undoubtedly meant to prohibit the commercial, for-profit buying and
selling of human organs for transplantation. The extent to which the NOTA
congress intended to reach other exchanges in which the donor receives some
benefit, however, is far from clear. For example, the title of section 301,
39
“Prohibition of organ purchases,” suggests a congressional concern with the
buying and selling of organs for profit, as do statements in the accompanying
40
Senate and House conference reports. During House hearings on NOTA, the
most commonly discussed issues were the need to address the organ shortage
through a combination of national coordination and federal financial support
and the controversial provision for Medicare coverage of outpatient
41
immunosuppressive drugs. Several House members did mention the section
35. See, e.g., Legality of Alternative Organ Donation Practices Under 42 U.S.C. § 274e to Gen.
Counsel Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 31 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 (2007).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see also e.g. Prewit v. Wilson, 103 U.S. 22, 24 (1880) (“Marriage is to be ranked among the
valuable considerations, yet it is distinguishable from most of these in not being reducible to a value
which can be expressed in dollars and cents.” (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN: UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE SEVERAL STATES, AND AT COMMON
LAW AND IN EQUITY § 776 (Boston, Little, Brown & Company 1878) (variation in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Contemporaneous state laws also define “valuable consideration” as
involving financial gain. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f(a), (c)(2) (West 2010) (prohibiting the
transfer of any human organ for valuable consideration, then defining valuable consideration as
“financial gain or advantage.”). Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner assume that
“valuable consideration” has the same meaning as “consideration” under contract law, but conclude
that some altruistically motivated exchanges, including NEAD chains, operate under a legal fiction that
treats certain exchanges for value, when undertaken for altruistic purposes, as gifts. Stephen J. Choi,
Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 289. We believe that RTT passes muster as such a legal fiction. See infra notes
71–73 and accompanying text (distinguishing RTT from the “altruism exchanges” proposed by Choi, et.
al., which the authors conclude would require an amendment to NOTA).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
40. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2–4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976–78 (stating that
NOTA “[p]rohibits the interstate buying and selling of human organs for transplantation” and “is
directed at preventing the for-profit marketing of kidneys and other organs”); H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127,
at 16 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 3992 (“This Title intends to make the
buying and selling of human organs unlawful.”).
41. See generally To Amend the Public Health Service Act to Authorize Financial Assistance for
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301 prohibition against valuable consideration in exchange for human organs,
sometimes with a specific allusion to the Jacobs venture, but without
elaborating on the meaning of the term “valuable consideration” beyond
commercial buying and selling. For example, California Representative Henry
A. Waxman stated,
In recent months, proposals have been made to encourage otherwise healthy
individuals to sell one of their kidneys in exchange for payments ranging from $6,000 to
$50,000. If these commercial ventures were allowed to proceed, I believe our efforts to
promote voluntary organ donations would collapse, and health risks to transplant
42
patients would greatly increase.

Several other House-member statements clearly condemn the buying and
selling of organs, but fail to mention NOTA’s possible application to the type of
43
nonpecuniary benefits contemplated by RTT.
Even the most specific references to the section 301 ban tend to address the
meaning and scope of other section 301 terms, and not the meaning of
“valuable consideration.” The most detailed discussions of section 301
terminology, for example, address clarifications or expansions of the definition
of “reasonable expenses” and arguments to exclude blood, blood products, and
44
other items from the definition of “organ.”
In 1983, after NOTA had been introduced in both the House and Senate,
but before the statute’s passage, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
45
Resources held hearings on organ transplantation. As in the House, references
to the Jacobs proposal by several senators were accompanied by condemnations
46
of the buying and selling of organs. Also like the House discussions, there was
Organ Procurement Organizations, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong. (1984) [hereinafter Hearing on
Financial Assistance for Organ Procurement Organizations].
42. Id. at 26 (statement of Rep. Waxman, Chairman, S. Comm. on Health & the Environment,
Comm. on Energy & Commerce) (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 31 (statement of Rep. Madigan) (“I wholeheartedly agree that the buying of human
organs should be made illegal.”); id. at 34 (statement of Rep. Moore) (“I also agree with the comment
that Mr. Waxman made in his testimony that we ought to prohibit the sale of organs.”).
44. Id. at 34 (statement of Rep. Gore) (“[W]e are changing the bill to change the definition of
‘valuable consideration,’ so that it does not include the reasonable costs associated with removal,
processing, preservation, quality control procedures, storage, and transportation.”); id. at 36 (statement
of Rep. Gore) (noting that “[w]e are going to specifically exclude corneas” from the definition of
“organ”); id. at 131 (statement of Robert E. Stevenson, Ph.D., Chairman, Standards Comm., Am. Ass’n
of Tissue Banks) (noting that although the then current draft excluded “the ‘reasonable costs
associated with removal, storage and transportation’ the bill fails to consider the reasonable costs of
quality control, processing, and preservation which are equally essential to high quality organ and tissue
transplantation”); id. at 116 (statement of James E. Davis, M.D., Am. Med. Ass’n) (urging the
exclusion of blood and blood products from the ban on organ sales); id. at 170 (statement of Mary Jane
O'Neill, Exec. Dir., The Eye-Bank for Sight Restoration, Inc.) (urging the inclusion of “processing,
preservation and quality control procedures among the reasonable costs not included in the term
‘valuable consideration’”).
45. Examination of the Problems Involved in Obtaining Organs for Transplant Surgery: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on
Problems in Obtaining Organs].
46. Id. at 13 (statement of Sen. Quayle) (referencing “the [Washington Post] article about the
Virginia physician who has written the FDA seeking a license to import organs” and condemning such
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some dialogue on the term “reasonable expenses.” For example, witnesses
expressed concern that “reasonable expenses” must include out-of-pocket
expenses associated with organ donation, such as travel, lost wages, and the
like, lest the statute operate as a deterrent to organ donation, rather than an
47
encouragement. But, as in the House, a careful reading of the Senate history of
NOTA suggests that Congress paid little, if any, attention to the possible
meanings of and ambiguities in the phrase “valuable consideration.”
In sum, a vast academic literature addresses valuable consideration under
48
NOTA. Concerns about running afoul of the provision have halted state
programs, such as Pennsylvania’s planned pilot program to reimburse funeral
expenses, and have caused uncertainty about the validity of specific practices,
49
such as kidney swaps. Commentators debate the meaning of the term and what
50
Congress must have intended with this ambiguous language.
But our analysis suggests that Congress, in passing NOTA, only considered
the term “valuable consideration” in the context of a very specific and
immediately salient threat involving for-profit, commercial exchanges.
Attempts to divine NOTA’s intended scope from the statute’s legislative history
are, thus, of limited use. Congress provided almost no guidance on the meaning
of the term beyond the obvious threat of buying, selling, and for-profit
commerce in human organs and failed to outline the extent to which NOTA
reaches other exchanges—like RTT—in which the donor receives some
nonpecuniary value.
C. From NOTA to the Norwood Act
Between the passage of NOTA in 1984 and the Norwood Act in 2007,
Congress had several occasions to clarify, expand, or otherwise alter the ban
against valuable consideration in exchange for human organs and failed to do
so. For example, bills were introduced or considered that would have allowed
tax credits, honorific awards, and the provision of insurance policies as
51
incentives for organ donation. None of these bills passed, however, and

methods); id. at 135 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (referencing the organ-brokerage proposal of a
“Virginia physician”).
47. See, e.g., id. at 250 (statement of Carol G. Bluemle) (“To send or threaten to send donors to
prison for receiving reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses would decrease the total pool of
available kidneys.”).
48. Jed Adam Gross, E Pluribus UNOS: The National Organ Transplant Act and Its Postoperative
Complications, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 145, 148 (2013) (finding that the vast majority of
articles on NOTA address the section 301 ban against valuable consideration).
49. Sally Satel et al., supra note 33; see infra text accompanying note 53 (discussing the uncertainty
surrounding kidney swaps).
50. See, e.g., R. S. Gaston et al., Limiting Financial Disincentives in Live Organ Donation: A
Rational Solution to the Kidney Shortage, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2548 (2006) (proposing a
compensation scheme for organ donors and defending its legality under NOTA).
51. Rick K. Jones et al., supra note 33 (detailing these bills and the surrounding debates); Erin D.
Williams et al., Living Organ Donation and Valuable Consideration, Congressional Research Service
CRS-3 (2010) (detailing bills designed to incentivize organ donation).
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NOTA’s original language banning valuable consideration remained
52
unchanged.
However, in 2007, Congress revisited the term “valuable consideration”
when passing the Norwood Act. Prior to 2007, some organ-procurement
organizations, other nonprofit organizations, and individual transplant
programs had implemented KPD programs. Due to an interpretation by the
Department of Health and Human Services that KPD may violate NOTA,
however, many hospitals and the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS)
53
were reluctant to perform paired donations, for fear of violating NOTA.
In the course of enacting the Norwood Act, many congressional members
made claims regarding the intent of the NOTA-enacting Congress with respect
to the phrase “valuable consideration,” reiterating the enacting Congress’s
refrain that the statute was intended to prohibit the buying and selling of
transplantable organs. We do not reference that discussion to suggest that these
remarks have any direct bearing on the term’s meaning—most legal scholars
54
conclude that they do not. Nonetheless, we believe that, due to the similarities
between KPD and RTT, the Norwood Act’s legislative history will be reviewed
by courts and commentators considering the legality of RTT for possible
insights into the policy rationales underpinning permitted transactions that
55
involve the exchange of nonpecuniary benefits.
Representative Inslee stated on the House floor when introducing the
Norwood Act, “I believe it is imperative that we make it clear that there is no
intent by Congress to bar [KPD]. It is my hope that the Senate will act quickly
56
on this. Simply put, we want this legislation to save lives immediately.”
Similarly, Representative Dingell insisted that “[t]he [valuable consideration]
clause was intended to outlaw the buying or selling of transplantable human
52. Although these failed congressional efforts thus did nothing to clarify or alter the meaning of
the term “valuable consideration” as used in NOTA, we reference the debates surrounding these
potential changes in part V, in which we analyze the possible federal concerns underlying NOTA.
53. 153 CONG. REC. 5439 (2007) (statement of Rep. Dingell); id. at 5439–40 (statement of Rep.
Gingrey).
54. Many commentators and jurists contend that subsequent legislative history of this sort should
have no relevance in statutory interpretation, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 809–10 (1983) (arguing that courts should
ignore subsequent legislative history), and black-letter statements of the law typically emphasize
subsequent legislative history’s inferior role, see, e.g., Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 n.11
(1979) (“[I]solated statements by individual Members of Congress or its committees, all made after the
enactment of the statute under consideration, cannot substitute for a clear expression of legislative
intent at the time of enactment.”).
55. Subsequent legislative history may provide insight on the probability of being overruled
through subsequent legislative action and in assessing current societal norms, both of which are
important to courts. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The
Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 215, 217–18, 225–26
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (arguing that the probability of legislative override
is relevant to courts and that they glean information about this probability from many sources,
including the current positions of legislators); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent
and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 467–68 (1988).
56. 153 CONG. REC. 5437 (2007) (statement of Rep. Inslee) (emphasis added).
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57

organs.” Said Representative Linder: “The valuable consideration clause has a
noble purpose, which is to keep people from buying and selling human
organs. . . . Let me be clear: paired-organ donation does not constitute the
58
buying or selling of organs.”
Some House members made reference to the fact that the Norwood Act
would “clarify” that NOTA’s ban on valuable consideration did not prohibit
59
KPD, suggesting that the statute was never intended to ban such behavior.
Charlie Norwood himself was even more explicit in a statement read into the
record (he had died just a month earlier from lung cancer that spread to his
60
liver, despite a successful lung transplant):
For years, people missed or were delayed in an opportunity to have a life-saving
kidney transplant simply because a member of the executive branch couldn’t grasp the
true intent of the National Organ Transplant Act’s valuable consideration clause. The
valuable consideration clause was meant to outlaw the buying and selling of organs,
which everyone agrees is proper. . . .
Now, I’m just an old country dentist, but isn’t this just common sense? I want to give
to someone, but I’m not compatible, but I can give to another patient. Their willing,
yet also incompatible, friend can give to my loved one. As a result, two people live;
two more slots are opened on the list for even more transplants to take place.
Common sense, Mr. Speaker.
However, instead of every single transplant center undertaking this commonsense
approach, some folks were denied the chance to be cross-matched and, instead, their
61
loved one suffered and even died while awaiting a transplant.

The Senate record expresses similar sentiments. For example, Senator
Levin, when introducing the Norwood Act legislation in the Senate, said,
This legislation is necessary because the National Organ Transplant Act, NOTA,
which contains a prohibition intended by Congress to preclude purchasing organs, is
unintentionally impeding the facilitation of matching incompatible pairs, as just
described. . . . That section has been interpreted by a number of transplant centers to
prohibit such donations. . . . Congress surely never intended that the living donation
arrangements that permit paired donation be impeded by NOTA. Our bill simply
62
makes that clear.

In sum, the Norwood Act’s legislative history does nothing to alter
conclusion in part IV.B that the NOTA Congress paid little attention to
possible meanings of the phrase “valuable consideration” beyond
immediately salient threat of for-profit organ brokerage. If anything,

our
the
the
the

57. Id. at 5439 (statement of Rep. Dingell).
58. Id. at 5440 (statement of Rep. Linder).
59. Id. at 5437 (statement of Rep. Barton) (“The legislation before us today clarifies the ability to
perform paired transplantations through the National Organ Transplant Act, or NOTA. This
legislation clarifies that paired donations are not considered a valuable consideration.”); id. at 5440
(statement of Rep. Gingrey) (“H.R. 710 would clarify in statute that this type of paired living kidney
donation would be allowed under Federal law.”).
60. John A. Schall, Congress Passes Legislation on Paired Kidney Donation, AM. ASS’N KIDNEY
PATIENTS,
https://www.aakp.org/advocacy/public-policy/item/congress-passes-legislation-on-pairedkidney-donation.html (last visited Sep. 28, 2014).
61. 153 CONG. REC. 5438 (2007) (statement of Rep. Norwood).
62. 153 CONG. REC. 33,289 (2007) (statement of Sen. Levin); 153 CONG. REC. 18,209 (2007)
(statement of Sen. Levin) (nearly identical to the formerly cited one).
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Norwood Act legislative history suggests that the Norwood Act was intended as
a safe harbor from NOTA for risk-averse transplant centers and that NOTA
does not speak to the type of altruistic exchange contemplated by RTT at all,
though we hesitate to read too much into that conclusion. As already noted, the
dominant view among scholars and jurists is that subsequent legislative history
is, if not wholly irrelevant in determining a statute’s meaning, at least of
secondary importance as compared to the original text and contemporaneous
legislative history. Many scholars have argued that subsequent legislative
history is, nonetheless, relevant to courts, and for that reason, we review the
Norwood Act legislative history here. This relevance arises not because courts
use such history to determine what the enacting Congress meant, but because
courts have a natural aversion to being overridden and are often interpreting
vague language by reference to contemporary social norms and standards.
Considered together with the text and legislative history of NOTA, we find no
indication that Congress contemplated exchanges such as RTT when enacting
NOTA (or, for that matter, when passing Norwood), and we proceed to the
policy rationales underlying the ban for greater insight into Congress’s likely
intent.
V
POLICY RATIONALES
Even if Congress did not clearly specify the intended scope of NOTA’s
prohibition against valuable consideration in exchange for human organs,
commentators have asserted a variety of public policy concerns that justify the
ban, many of which appear to resonate with at least some members of the
NOTA-enacting Congress and later Congresses. In this part, we analyze those
public policy concerns and demonstrate that RTT does not run afoul of any of
them. In fact, RTT actually minimizes some of those concerns better than
existing transplant practices do.
When considering the extent to which RTT withstands common objections
to inducements, it is important to remember one important difference between
RTT and other inducement schemes that might qualify as valuable
consideration under NOTA: RTT does not provide an inducement to donate an
organ. Rather, RTT provides an inducement for someone who, in a perfect
world free of financial and immunological barriers, would altruistically donate
an organ to a friend or family member, to instead donate that same organ to
someone else. Once this is recognized, it becomes clear how and why RTT does
not run afoul of standard objections to inducements to donate.
To illustrate, recall that Carlos is willing to altruistically donate his kidney to
Diana. However, because Carlos and Diana are poor and the Mexican public
health care system does not provide immunosuppression to transplant patients,
Carlos’s donation to Diana would be pointless—in the absence of
immunosuppression, her body would reject the kidney and the transplant would
fail. Thus, Carlos is not a person uninterested in or ambivalent about organ
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donation who has been induced to donate through the lure of compensation.
Rather, Carlos is a person with perfect-world donative intent. RTT merely
ensures that Carlos’s donation results in a successful transplant to Diana, while
at the same time helping an immunologically incompatible American pair
through a kidney swap.
A. Equality of Access
Many objections to the exchange of valuable consideration for organs rest
on concerns about unequal access. Some commentators worry, for example,
that in a system that permits valuable consideration, only the rich will have
63
access to organs. Access concerns are evident in congressional deliberations on
organ donation and appear to animate at least some objections to the exchange
64
of valuable consideration for transplantable organs. Although others dispute
the contention that inducements to donate would necessarily disadvantage the
poor, arguing that access issues are easily addressed through a variety of
mechanisms, we need not engage that debate here because RTT easily
65
withstands this objection. RTT is specifically designed to provide transplant
access to the poor by providing them with necessary immunosuppression that
they could not otherwise afford. In terms of access, therefore, RTT improves
upon the status quo.
B. Coercion and Exploitation
One set of concerns frequently expressed with transplant tourism (or,
indeed, inducements to the poor more generally) relates to coercion and
exploitation, and these concerns are evident in some of the legislative history
66
regarding organ donation. Concern over coercion normally involves a worry
that poor sellers will be forced into selling their organs because they have no

63. Gerald Dworkin, Markets & Morals: The Case for Organ Sales, in MORALITY, HARM, AND
THE LAW 155, 157–58 (Gerald Dworkin ed., 1994).
64. Hearing on Financial Assistance for Organ Procurement Organizations, supra note 41, at 174;
National Organ Transplant Act, Hearing Before The Subcommittee On Health, House of
Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress Second Session On H.R. 4080, (statement of National
Association of Patients on Hemodialysis and Transplantation, Inc.) p. 174 February 9, 1984 (“If
purchasing an organ [e]ver became the primary means of obtaining a transplant, those of greater wealth
would obviously be at a substantial advantage.”); Hearing on Problems in Obtaining Organs, supra note
45, at 131 (statement of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum) (expressing concern regarding organ markets that
“if you had enough money you could . . . see to it that you got an organ.”); id. at 212 (testimony of Gary
B. Friedliaenidere M.D., President (Interim), American Council on Transplantation) (“It would be
unconscionable to create a system by which only the most wealthy would benefit.”).
65. See, e.g., T. Randolph Beard & Jim Leitzel, Designing a Compensated–Kidney Donation
System, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 253.
66. In 2003, Congress declined to allow incentives for donation of cadaveric organs based on a
concern that such a program would “unduly put pressure on low-income individuals.” Assessing
Initiatives to Increase Organ Donations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 4 (2003). Congress was particularly concerned
with “exploit[ing] vulnerable members of society.” Id. at 64.
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reasonable alternative. Critics concerned about exploitation generally envision
a bad bargain for or unfair advantage over the weaker party to the transaction,
which, in this case, is the poor Mexican pair of Carlos and Diana.
Dealing with exploitation first, it is difficult to see how RTT could be
considered exploitative of Carlos and Diana. Neither Diana nor Carlos receive
a bad bargain in the transaction relative to either the other pair (Amanda and
Bob) or to their respective outcomes in the absence of an RTT swap. In the
absence of a swap, Carlos could donate his kidney, but Diana’s body would
reject the kidney for lack of immunosuppression and the transplant would fail.
With the RTT swap, Diana receives the immunosuppression she needs for the
transplant to succeed. In both cases, Carlos is left with only one kidney. But
with RTT, Diana has the chance of a successful transplant, which is a better
state of affairs for both Carlos and Diana.
Similarly, RTT does not appear to coerce Carlos. This is not a case, such as
those often invoked in arguments against inducements to donate, in which a
poor person sells her organ in order to provide food or shelter for her family or
68
to escape bonded labor. Although one could question whether even these
examples are, in fact, coercive, we need not do so here. Rather, we emphasize
again Carlos’s perfect-world donative intent, which is thwarted only by his
poverty and Diana’s lack of access to immunosuppression. The donation is not
motivated by the RTT scheme, but only facilitated by it.
To the extent that any lingering concerns regarding the informed or
voluntary nature of the Carlos–Diana choice remain, they are addressable
through existing safeguards employed in the United States to ensure informed
consent and voluntariness among organ donors. In fact, meeting these
safeguards would be a prerequisite for any RTT program. Recall that Carlos
would travel to the United States for his nephrectomy—thus, Carlos’s screening
for donor eligibility would be the same as that performed for swap participants
in the United States.
C. Commodification
Also sometimes labeled corruption or alienation, this objection (or, more
accurately, collection of objections) to inducements relates to the purported
69
degrading effect of market exchange on certain items or activities. In the case
of inducements for organs, the specific objection is normally that allowing
valuable consideration in exchange for organs devalues humanity by treating

67. See I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating the Organ Market: Normative Foundations for Market
Regulation, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 71 (providing more formal definitions of
various strands of the coercion, exploitation, and justified paternalism concerns, with illustrative
examples).
68. See id. (providing these and other examples).
69. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS, at xii–xiii (1993)
(discussing commodification); Dworkin, supra note 63, at 159 (referring to commodification as “a large
class of arguments” that are “diverse in character”).
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the human body and its parts as mere commodities.
It can be hard to refute an objection as inchoate as commodification, but
RTT does not seem to implicate the concerns most critics have in mind with this
objection. Carlos does not “sell” his organ or value it like cash or its
equivalents. Rather, Carlos trades one like good—a healthy kidney—in
exchange for another healthy kidney. Diana also receives immunosuppression
thanks to the RTT exchange, but it is not obvious that this corrupts the
exchange, the parties to it, or human beings more generally.
Although congressional members have, at times, expressed concerns that
fall within the commodification family, these concerns arose in the context of
71
condemnations of monetary payments in exchange for human organs. The text
of the statute, legislative history, and animating policy goals discussed
throughout this article all suggest that RTT would not be derailed by the courts
or Congress because of commodification concerns. Instead, RTT is most similar
to KPD, which Congress has already explicitly approved, and AUKPD and
NEAD chains, which, although never explicitly permitted by Congress,
currently enjoy widespread acceptance.
D. Slippery Slopes
A final possible objection to RTT relates not to RTT itself but to its possible
effect on the validity of future proposals to increase the organ supply. If the
exchange of one kidney for another kidney plus immunosuppression and
medically necessary transport is valid under NOTA, then what is to prevent the
exchange of a kidney for a kidney plus college tuition for a donor’s child—or,
for that matter, for a beachfront condominium?
This fear, though understandable, is unwarranted. RTT passes muster under
NOTA due to a combination of three unusual characteristics of the exchange:
(1) Carlos’s perfect-world donative intent, (2) Carlos’s altruistic motivation, and
(3) the medical necessity of the benefit received in the swap (Diana’s
immunosuppression and transport). Carlos’s perfect-world donative intent—the
same donative intent present in KPD, AUKPD, and NEAD chains—has
already been discussed at some length. In addition, Carlos’s motivation for the
exchange is altruistic: He wants to benefit Diana rather than himself. These two
factors distinguish RTT from other common proposals to increase the organ
supply through inducements, such as financial incentives that accrue directly to
the donor.
Finally, the benefit in question—Diana’s immunosuppression and clinic
71
travel—is incidental to and medically necessary for the transplant to succeed.
70. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 125–26 (1996) (discussing organ
markets and commodification).
71. We recognize the possibility of some slipperiness in the concepts of “incidental to” and
“medically necessary for” the transplant. Conceivably, expenses other than transportation and
immunosuppression could be characterized as medically necessary to the success of the transplant.
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In this sense, RTT is more like current exchange practices, such as KPD,
AUKPD, and NEAD chains, along with practices explicitly excluded from
NOTA, such as reasonable payments to donors incidental to the transplant,
72
including travel, housing, and lost wages. This characteristic distinguishes RTT
from other inducement proposals that rely on altruism, such as the altruism
exchanges proposed by Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner in
this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems, which the authors conclude
73
would likely require an amendment to NOTA.
Thus, the text of the statute, legislative history, and animating policy goals
discussed throughout this article all suggest that payments for
immunosuppression and drug travel—the only component of RTT that could
even possibly be construed as valuable consideration—should not be labeled as
such.
VI
BENEFITS OF RTT
Thus far, we have explained why RTT does not run afoul of the language of
or public policy animating NOTA. However, RTT has important benefits yet to
be discussed. In this part, we detail those benefits.
A. Cost Savings to the U.S. Health Care System
Innovation in health care currently focuses on improving the quality of care
while reducing the cost. There is perhaps no single disease entity in which this
purpose is more easily achieved than ESRD. Simply put, ESRD is most
commonly treated by dialysis, but this form of treatment is much less effective,
and ultimately much more costly, than kidney transplantation. According to the
2013 USRDS Annual Data Report, one year of hemodialysis cost the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) $87,945 in 2011 (the last year data is
74
available), whereas one year of kidney transplantation cost CMS $32,922. Over
five years, transplanting a single ESRD patient rather than having the patient
remain on dialysis saves CMS $273,235. If a patient instead undergoes a
transplant preemptively (before starting dialysis), the commercial payer (that is,
the health-insurance company) receives a net cost-avoidance benefit of
$250,000–$400,000 during the thirty-three months Medicare is the secondary
75
payer. Thus, RTT would save money for the U.S. health care system and
Permissible expenditures could be limited, however, to the same types of transplant-related expenses
currently paid in the United States by insurance providers and nonprofit entities.
72. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (discussing these exclusions).
73. Choi et al., supra note 38.
74. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 2 2013 USRDS ANNUAL DATA REPORT: ATLAS OF END-STAGE
RENAL
DISEASE
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
328
(2013),
available
at
http://www.usrds.org/2013/pdf/v2_ch11_13.pdf (“Per person per year Medicare ESRD fell 0.3 and 0.5
percent, respectively, to $87,945 and $32,922 in 2011, compared to a rise of 6.6 percent in peritoneal
dialysis patients, to $71,630.”)
75. F. D. Irwin, A. F. Bonagura, S. W. Crawford & M. Foote, Kidney Paired Donation: A Payer
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insurance providers.
B. Better Health Outcomes
In addition to the cost savings, the average patient who receives a deceaseddonor kidney transplant lives ten years longer than they would had they
76
remained on dialysis. Further, living-donor kidney transplants function on
77
average for 14.7 years, while deceased-donor kidneys last only 8.9 years. Thus,
increasing the number of patients receiving transplants via living-donor chains
and simultaneous exchanges reduces the number of patients on dialysis, and
leads to better health, better health care, and lower costs for those patients. For
those who remain on the kidney waiting list, RTT also gives them a better
chance of receiving a deceased-donor organ.
VII
START-UP, SUSTAINABILITY, AND SAFEGUARDS
In this part, we provide some initial thoughts on what will be necessary to
bring an RTT system into being, as well as to sustain it. To pilot the RTT
concept and to demonstrate its value to those who stand to financially benefit,
philanthropy is necessary. Otherwise, those who do stand to benefit will never
see RTT’s potential.
However, RTT will not become sustainable if it is based on philanthropy
alone. In order to make RTT sustainable, the costs of an RTT program will
have to be paid by those who will gain from it financially. The structure of such
funding is not difficult to resolve: Benefitting stakeholders can simply donate to
78
the aforementioned nonprofit in our proposed RTT structure. But who are the
stakeholders?
We identify three: insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, and
CMS. Health-insurance providers should be interested in funding RTT because
they save a substantial amount of money for each person who receives a
transplant instead of remaining on dialysis (because dialysis is much more
expensive than transplantation)—more money than they would have to pay per
RTT transplant. Commercial payers are likely to save in excess of $300,000 for
79
each patient preemptively receiving a transplant prior to starting dialysis.
Assuming that in Mexico the cost of immunosuppressive medications is about
$8000 per month, RTT would cost the aforementioned nonprofit about
$100,000 for ten years of immunosuppressive medications and for travel to and

Perspective, 12 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1388, 1388 (2012).
76. Robert A. Wolfe et al., Comparison of Mortality in All Patients on Dialysis, Patients on
Dialysis Awaiting Transplantation, and Recipients of a First Cadaveric Transplant, 341 N. ENGL. J.
MED., 1725, 1729 (1999).
77. J. Matas et al., Kidney Transplant Half-Life (t[ ½]) After Rapid Discontinuation of Prednisone,
87 TRANSPLANTATION 100, 101 (2009).
78. See supra Part III.A.
79. See Irwin et al., supra note 75, at 1338.
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from the recipient’s Mexican transplant health-care provider. Thus, an
insurance company would save approximately $200,000 in dialysis costs by
contributing to an RTT nonprofit. It therefore seems a reasonable investment
on the part of a commercial insurance carrier to make a donation to a nonprofit
that supports reverse transplant tourism so that RTT could eventually become
sustainable.
Involving insurance companies in the funding of RTT requires safeguards,
however, to ensure that insurance-company donors have no ability to influence
patient selection and transplant decisions. Specifically, in order for a
commercial insurance company to donate money to a nonprofit involved in
reverse transplant tourism, the algorithm matching international patients with
American patients would have to be transparent and clearly demonstrate that
the insurance companies’ financial contributions did not influence the allocation
of kidneys in favor of the companies’ patients. There could be no implication
that a specific insurance company could purchase a kidney for a specific patient.
Commercial payers are not the only commercial organizations that could
benefit from reverse transplant tourism. Pharmaceutical companies that sell
immunosuppressive drugs gain a new source of profit with every patient
receiving a transplant—a source that lasts for the lifetime of the patient. The
average annual cost of immunosuppressive agents in the U.S. is $15,000–
80
$20,000. Given a reasonable profit margin from these drugs, pharmaceutical
companies’ benefit from an RTT-induced uptick in transplants would be
substantial. It would therefore be in the pharmaceutical industry’s best interest
to donate to a reverse–transplant tourism nonprofit. However, as with the
commercial insurance payers, there could be no implication that a specific
pharmaceutical company would purchase a kidney for a specific patient or
program in which that pharmaceutical company’s drugs were more likely to be
used.
Finally, CMS would also have an incentive to donate to an RTT nonprofit.
CMS as an entity saves $273,235 per transplant as compared with dialysis over
five years. Thus, CMS could legitimately use part of this savings to support RTT
as a means of both reducing the overall cost of ESRD for American taxpayers
and improving the quality of health care provided. As noted in part VI,
innovation in American health care is being driven by the desire to decrease
cost while improving the quality of health care. As renal transplantation (as
opposed to remaining on dialysis) is one of the best examples of this type of
innovation, reverse transplant tourism is an example of the type of innovation
that CMS is trying to promote. Although it seems hard to imagine that the U.S.
government would invest $100,000 to help transplant a poor international
patient when there are so many poor people in the United States lacking
adequate health care, it is clear that such an investment in an RTT transplant
80. Roger W. Evans et al., Cost-Related Immunosuppressive Medication Nonadherence Among
Kidney Transplant Recipients, 5 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 2323, 2326 (2010) (“[A]nnual
third party reimbursements for a patient who has a functioning kidney transplant average $16,844.”).
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would actually still save U.S. taxpayers $173,235 and provide better health care
to one American who would otherwise have remained on dialysis. As with the
other potential stakeholders, though, CMS’s support of such a nonprofit could
not be directly linked to Medicare patients receiving transplants.
VIII
CONCLUSION
As we have demonstrated, RTT could provide benefits to U.S. patients in
need of kidney transplantation, as well as to the U.S. health care system more
generally and to impoverished international patients who otherwise would have
no access to transplantation. But there is more to be said in favor of RTT. RTT
also provides particular benefit to certain segments of the U.S. population, such
as O–blood type patients and highly sensitized patients.
As previously noted, O–blood type patients are disadvantaged in a typical
KPD program, relative to other–blood type patients, due to the shortage of O–
81
blood type donors in the KPD donor pool. Highly sensitized patients also face
challenges. Because RTT brings immunologically compatible pairs to the
United States in exchange for medical treatment, RTT provides an influx of
easy-to-match recipients and O donors into the KPD pool. This is particularly
true when RTT partnerships involve poor countries, whose compatible pairs
have an incentive to participate in KPD that those in rich countries do not have.
There is a final advantage to RTT partnerships with a country such as
Mexico: ethnic diversity. Although people of different races frequently match
with and donate to one another, an individual has a better chance of finding a
match with a potential donor from her ethnic group because of the higher
likelihood of compatible blood types and tissue markers. And the need for
donation is particularly acute for members of minority ethnic groups in the
United States: Although ethnic groups donate in rough proportion to their
82
population, minorities’ incidence of ESRD is higher. Thus, increasing the
racial and ethnic diversity of the donor pool, although beneficial to all U.S.
recipients, is especially valuable to racial and ethnic minorities.
The benefits of RTT for the individuals involved and the U.S. health care
system are many and suggest that any lingering uncertainties about the validity
of RTT would be resolved in the proposal’s favor. Instead of non-U.S. kidney
donors being offered money through a black-market middleman in exchange
for one of their kidneys, RTT would provide a legal and ethical exchange of
living-donor kidneys through kidney-paired donation. In this way, the donors
will not receive money for their kidneys, but rather will receive a transplant for

81. See supra text accompanying notes 12–15 (discussing O–blood type donors in KPD).
82. For example, non-Caucasians are three times more likely to suffer from ESRD than are
Caucasians. Why Minority Donors are Needed, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/whydonate/
minorities.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). African Americans, Hispanics, and American Indians make
up 56% of the over 98,701 people with ESRD waiting for a deceased donor kidney in America. See
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/advancedData.asp.
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